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BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION
Conventional packet-Switching networks permit cheap and reliable communications independent of the distance between a Source node and a destination node in the net work. Conventional networks, however, rely upon either public keys or shared private keys to provide privacy for messages that pass through the network's linkS. Public keys have the drawback that they have never been proven to be difficult to decipher. Therefore, it is possible that an efficient means of cracking public keys may one day be discovered. The result of such a discovery would be that all public key technology would become obsolete. All Supposedly "secure" networks based on public key technology would thus become vulnerable. Shared private keys also have the draw back that the logistics of distributing the private keys can be prohibitive.
Quantum cryptography represents a recent technological development that provides for the assured privacy of a communications link. Quantum cryptography is founded upon the laws of quantum physics and permits the detection of eavesdropping acroSS a link. Quantum cryptography, thus, ensures the Security of keys distributed across the link. Quantum cryptographic techniques have been convention ally applied acroSS Single links in a network. Quantum cryptography requires the reliable transmission and receipt of Single photons for distributing encryption/decryption keys. However, Single photons cannot be reliably transmit ted over large distances. Single quantum cryptographic links are, therefore, distance limited. For example, a Single quan tum cryptographic link cannot be any longer than Some tens of miles when transmitting through fiber optic cabling.
Therefore, there exists a need for a System and method that combines the assured privacy achieved with quantum cryptography with the distance independent communication achieved with conventional multi-node, multi-link packet Switching networks.
SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION
Systems and methods consistent with the present inven tion address this need by implementing a quantum cryptographic communications network that permits privacy assured communication over large distances. The commu nications network of the present invention implements quan tum cryptographic techniques that can ensure the privacy of encrypted data transmitted acroSS multiple nodes and links within a packet-Switching network. A host can thus Send encrypted data in a quantum-cryptographic communications Systems and methods consistent with the present inven tion additionally provide a key archive that can Store and audit the encryption keys generated and used in a quantum cryptographic communications network. Encryption key audits permit validation of keys used throughout the quantum-cryptographic network. The validations can pro vide indications of failures in quantum cryptographic mechanisms, or associated keying algorithms, that can be noted and acted upon by a network Security authority.
In accordance with the purpose of the invention as embodied and broadly described herein, a method of archiving encryption keys used for encrypting information in a network includes collecting one or more encryption keys generated at at least one node in the network. The method further includes transmitting the one or more col lected encryption keys to a key archive. The method also includes Storing the collected encryption keys in a database of the key archive.
In another implementation consistent with the present invention, a method of archiving encryption keys used for encrypting information in a network includes receiving encryption keys generated at a plurality of nodes in a network, and Storing the received encryption keys in encryp tion key archive.
In a further implementation consistent with the present invention, a method of auditing encryption keys used for encrypting information in a network includes collecting one or more encryption keys generated at a node for encrypting data, providing the one or more collected encryption keys to a key archive, Storing the collected encryption keys in a database of the key archive, and determining whether at least one of the one or more collected keys Satisfies given Standards.
BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
The accompanying drawings, which are incorporated in and constitute a part of this specification, illustrate an embodiment of the invention and, together with the description, explain the invention. The following detailed description of the invention refers to the accompanying drawings. The same reference numbers in different drawings identify the same or Similar elements. Also, the following detailed description does not limit the invention. Instead, the Scope of the invention is defined by the appended claims.
Systems and methods, consistent with the present invention, permit the implementation of quantum crypto graphic techniques in multi-node packet-Switching net works. In quantum cryptography, encryption keys are derived from random bit Sequences that are encoded in the phase/polarization States of Single photons transmitted from one node to the next. Based on the known Heisenberg Uncertainty principle, any attempt to eavesdrop upon the transmitted encryption keys will induce error rates in the received encryption keys that can be detected at the receiv ing node. Quantum cryptography can thus detect eavesdropping, and in accordance with the present invention, provide link Security information that can be used in forwarding encrypted messages acroSS a network.
Exemplary Initialization processing begins with each QC-node in network 105 preparing a unique identifier for identifying itself step 1205). This identifier may be preset in memory 610 by the node manufacturer, selected by a node administrator, derived from a random or pseudo-random process, or derived by any other appropriate method. Each QC-node then transmits its unique identifier to all connected nodes over a traffic channel step 1210). Transmission of the unique identifier from each QC-node may be repeated, Staggered in time, or acknowledged in accordance with conventional message transmission techniques.
Each QC-node in network 105 waits a fixed period of time to receive all unique identifiers transmitted from connected nodes step 1215). This fixed period of time may be preset or periodically updated according to network topology. Each QC-node Selects a "master' node according to an algorithm common to all nodes in network 105 step 1220). The common algorithm can, for example, determine which iden tifier of all of the identifiers received from connected nodes is the arithmetic minimum. Other algorithms will be appar ent to one skilled in the art for Selecting an identifier from a Set of identifiers received from nodes connected to a node in network 105.
Each QC-node then marks an internal database in its QCLI that the master node has the selected identifier step 1225). The QC-node with the selected identifier then begins acting as the master node and all other connected nodes begin to act as Slave nodes. The node acting as the master node transmits the QC key to the slave nodes. The slave nodes perform the quantum cryptographic algorithms that enable the link to function.
Exemplary QC-Link Security Detection Processing FIGS. 13-14 illustrate flowcharts of exemplary quantum cryptographic link Security detection processing consistent with the present invention. The processing illustrated in FIGS. 13-14 uses conventional quantum cryptographic pro tocols to determine if eavesdropping has occurred on a link attached to a given QCLI or whether there has been a QCLI or link failure.
Link Security detection processing begins with a QCLI (e.g., QCLI 630 of router 505 connected to link 5.54 acting as a "master') transmitting a sequence of photons in accor dance with conventional quantum cryptographic protocols step 1305 (FIG. 13) . A receiving QCLI (e.g., a QCLI of router 510 acting as a "slave") receives the transmitted photons and evaluates the phase and/or polarization of the photons using conventional quantum cryptographic proto cols step 1310). Based on the evaluation, the receiving QCLI determines, using conventional quantum crypto graphic protocols, if eavesdropping has occurred on the link step 1315).
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For example, QCLI 630 of router 505 can randomly generate and Store a Sequence of phase or polarization values (e.g., 0, 45, 90 or 135 degree values for polarization) and apply these values, via phase/polarization modulator 1020, to a sequence of photons produced by photon Source 1015. After transmission across link 534, the receiving QCLI of router 510 receives each photon at photon detector 1025 and measures each photon's polarization or phase. The QCLI of router 510 then reports the measurement results back to the QCLI of router 505. If no eavesdropping has occurred on link 5.54, then the measured polarization or phase of each photon received at the QCLI of router 510 should corre spond to the actual polarization or phase of each photon transmitted from the QCLI of router 505. Based on quantum physics, however, if a rate of error in the measured polar ization or phases of received photons exceeds a certain threshold, then eavesdropping on link 5S4 is indicated and can be noted at the OCLIs of routers 505 and 510. The above described eavesdropping detection technique merely repre Sents one possible example of conventional quantum cryp tographic eavesdropping detection. One skilled in the art will recognize that other conventional QC-techniques may be equivalently used. Furthermore, the various links in QC-network 105 can each be protected by different quantum cryptographic techniques, as long as each QCLI at either end of a given link are compatible. Thus, each node in QC-network 105 can "bridge" differing quantum encryption technologies.
Returning to FIG. 13 , if conventional QC-protocols indi cate that eavesdropping has occurred on the link, processing proceeds to step 1335 below. If there has been no eavesdropping, the QCLI of router 510 then determines if there has been a failure of the QCLI itself step 1320). For example, QCLI hardware and/or software failures may be noted at processing units 605 or 1010 using conventional error messages. If there has been no QCLI failure, the QCLI of router 510 may further determine if there has been a link failure on the quantum key channel step 1325). For example, the receiving QCLI may note the complete ceSSa tion of key transmissions over a link and conclude that the link has failed. If the OCLI of router 510 determines that there has been a link failure, processing proceeds to Step 1335 described below. If there has been no link failure, the receiving QCLI sets the QC-link protection variable to "protected" and updates the appropriate entries of forward ing tables 720 and 725. At step 1335, the receiving QCLI sets the QC-link protection variable to "unprotected" and updates the appropriate entries of forwarding tables 720 and 725.
At step 1405 (FIG. 14) , the QCLI of router 510 reports the QC link protection variable to the routing engine 710 being executed in processing unit 605. Routing engine 710 then distributes the QC-link protection variable to other nodes in network 105 step 1410). Additionally, the router with the receiving QCLI may report the QC link protection variable to a network management entity responsible for administer ing QC-network 105 step 1415). The network management entity can Store the QC link protection variable in a cen tralized database step 1420 and signal an alarm if the received QC link protection variable indicates a link is unprotected step 1425).
Exemplary Forwarding tion. A host (e.g., host 535) in QC-network 105 receives a message from input device 615 step 1605). In response thereto, the host 535 determines whether the message requires protected links step 1610. For example, a host operator may specify, via input device 615, that the received message contains highly sensitive information and therefore requires protected links. If the message does not require protected links, the host 535 inserts an "un-secure' marking in the header of the message step 1620). For example, the host may insert an "un-Secure' marking in a "type of service" (TOS) indicator in the message header. However, if the message does require protected links, the host 535 inserts a "secure' marking in the header of the message step 1615. The host 535 completes the message processing by trans mitting the message towards the intended destination node step 1625).
Exemplary QC-Network End-to-End Message Processing FIGS. 17-19 illustrate flowcharts of exemplary end-to-end quantum cryptographic network message transmission processing, consistent with the present invention, in the case where the Source host requests transmission acroSS protected links in a QC-network, Such as OC-network 105. A source host (e.g., host 535) formulates a message for transmission, using for example, user input from input device 615
Step 1705). The source host 535 then may optionally encrypt the formulated message step 1710). The host 535 may, for example, apply end-to-end encryption to the formulated message in accordance with conventional encryption tech niques. The Source host 535 then passes the message to the QCLI, such as QCLI 630 step 1715). The source host's QCLI 630 applies QC-link encryption to the message step 1720). The QCLI 630 may apply any conventional quantum cryptographic encryption technique. The Source host's QCLI 630 then transmits the QC-link encrypted message on the QCLI's traffic channel step 1725).
At step 1730, a router (e.g., router 505) in QC-network 11 cryptographic decryption techniques step 1735). The rout er's QCLI passes the message to the router's forwarding engine 715 step 1805) (FIG. 18) .
At step 1810, the router's forwarding engine 715 deter mines a next hop for the message using information from protected link forwarding table 725. The router's forwarding engine 715 passes the message to an appropriate outgoing QCLI step 1815). The outgoing QCLI applies QC-link encryption to the message step 1820). The router's QCLI transmits the link-encrypted message on the QCLI's traffic channel to the next hop node determined by forwarding table 725 step 1825).
When the next hop node receives the message, the node determines if it is the message's intended destination host step 1830). For example, the next hop node may compare the destination address in the message header with the address assigned to the next hop node. If the next hop node determines that it is not the destination host, processing returns to step 1810 above. If the next hop node determines that it is the intended destination host, then the host's OCLI decrypts the QC-link-encrypted message using conventional quantum cryptographic techniques step 1905 (FIG. 19) .
The destination host's QCLI passes the decrypted message to processing unit 605 step 1910). The destination host then may optionally decrypt any end-to-end encryption applied at the source host step 1915). The processing unit 605 of the destination host then receives the decrypted message step 1920).
Exemplary Router Forwarding Processing  FIG. 20 illustrates a flowchart of exemplary router for warding processing consistent with the present invention. A router (e.g., router 505) in QC-network 105 receives an incoming message either from another router or from a host step 2005). In one exemplary embodiment of the present invention, QC-network 105 may only handle secure mes Sages and no Secure/un-Secure "type of Service' marking may therefore be included in message headers. Therefore, if QC-network 105 handles only secure traffic step 2010), processing continues at step 2025. If QC-network 105 handles both Secure and un-Secure traffic, processing con tinues at step 2015.
At step 2015, the router 505 inspects the "type of service"
(TOS) indicator in the message header step 2015). The router 505 determines whether the TOS indicates that secure links are required for transmission of the message step 2020). If secure links are not required, the router's forward ing engine 715 determines the next hop for the message using forwarding table 7202030. However, if secure links are required, the router's forwarding engine 715 determines the next hop for the message using protected link forwarding table 725 step 2025). The router's forwarding engine 715 then forwards the message towards the determined next hop step 2035). Exemplary QCLA Processing  FIG. 21 illustrates a flowchart of exemplary QCLA pro cessing consistent with the present invention. QCLA 730 periodically collects all keying bits that have been generated by QCLI 630 in accordance with conventional encryption techniques step 2105. The collected keying bits can include bits used to directly encrypt message traffic and bits that are used as "seeds' to a key generator that generates the keys that will actually generate the encryption bit-Stream. QCLA 730 then may optionally time stamp the collected keying bits step 2110). An external clock Source may be One skilled in the art will appreciate that any accurate Source of clock information can be used in the present invention.
Furthermore, if no accurate time Source is available, an inaccurate Source can be used together with an annotation that the clock Source may be inaccurate.
QCLA 730 next adds a unique identifier to the collection of keying bits step 2115). The identifier may include any type of information that uniquely identifies the network link. For example, an IP address may be used as the unique identifier. As an additional example, a unique identifier for router 505 together with a unique identifier for the interface may be used. As a further example, a hardware unique identifier embedded in Some component of the interface (e.g., in processing unit 1010 or network interface circuitry) may be used.
QCLA 730 then encrypts the collection of keying bits step 2120. QCLA can use any quantum cryptographic techniques including hardware or Software encryption, or both. Conventional public key cryptography may be used and may include digitally signing the collection as well as encrypting the collection. End-to-end encryption can be employed by the QCLA 730 and the collection of keying bits, thus, can only be decrypted by key archive 10. The encryption technique used must ensure a high degree of Security if the collection of keying bits should traverse any networks of lower security than QC-network 105.
QCLA 730 delivers an encrypted message containing an identifier identifying the QCLA and the collection of keying bits to key archive 110 step 2125. The encrypted message can be delivered asynchronously and by any reliable Store and-forward mechanism (e.g., e-mail). Alternatively, the encrypted message can be delivered in near real time by a reliable protocol Such as, for example, Transmission Control Protocol (TCP). The QCLA determines if an acknowledg ment is received from key archive 10 step 2130). If not, processing returns to Step 2125. If an acknowledgment is received, the processing completes. QCLA 730 may store messages in memory 1005 that have been sent but not yet acknowledged by key archive 10.
Exemplary Key Archival Processing  FIG. 22 illustrates a flowchart of exemplary encryption key archival processing consistent with the present inven tion. Key archive 10 receives an encrypted message from a QCLA, such as QCLA 730 step 2205). Key archive 110 decrypts the received message using conventional end-to end decryption techniques step 2210). Key archive 110 determines if the message decrypted properly step 2215). If not, key archive 10 notifies an event management System step 2220. Key archive 10 further updates QCLA message counter data 410 to indicate that an indecipherable message was received from the QCLA step 2225). Key archive also Stores the message in an "indecipherable' bin in database 325 step 2230).
If key archive 10 determines that the message decrypted properly, the archive sends an acknowledgment message to the sending QCLA step 2235. In response to receipt of the acknowledgment, the Sending QCLA can remove the mes sage from memory 1005 and cease efforts to transmit the message to key archive 110 step 2240 If no statistical errors have occurred, key archive 10 may additionally perform historical Studies on keys Stored in database 325 step 2335). For example, if a long segment of encrypted text is discovered in QC-network 105 or network 115, then the Segment of encrypted text can be tested to Verify if it can be decrypted using any of the keys Stored in database 325. If so, then the encrypted text must have been taken from an eavesdropped line, and the time and place of eavesdropping can be ascertained using, for example, header data accompanying the encrypted text.
CONCLUSION
Systems and methods consistent with the present inven tion implement quantum cryptographic techniques that can ensure the privacy of encrypted data transmitted acroSS multiple nodes and links within a packet-Switching network. Systems and methods consistent with the present invention additionally implement key archives that can receive and Store encryption keys generated at nodes throughout a quantum cryptographic network. The key archives permit auditing of the received encryption keys that can detect failures in network quantum cryptographic mechanisms. The foregoing description of exemplary embodiments of the present invention provides illustration and description, but is not intended to be exhaustive or to limit the invention to the precise form disclosed. Modifications and variations are possible in light of the above teachings or may be acquired from practice of the invention. No element, Step, or instruction used in the description of the present application should be construed as critical or essential to the invention unless explicitly described as Such. The Scope of the inven tion is defined by the following claims and their equivalents.
What is claimed is:
1. A method of archiving quantum-cryptographic encryp tion keys used for encrypting information in a network, comprising:
collecting one or more encryption keys generated at at least one node in Said network;
transmitting the one or more collected encryption keys to a key archive, and Storing Said collected encryption keys in a database of Said key archive. 2. The method of claim 1, further comprising: time-Stamping the one or more collected encryption keys. 3. The method of claim 1, further comprising: tagging the one or more collected encryption bits with an identifier identifying a link of Said network. performing a correlation analysis to determine whether at least one of Said encryption keys correlates with a Specified parameter. 10. A computer-readable medium containing instructions for controlling at least one processor to perform a method of archiving encryption keys used for encrypting information in a network, the method comprising:
obtaining encryption keys generated at a plurality of nodes in a network;
Storing Said received encryption keys in a database of an encryption key archive; and determining whether at least one of Said encryption keys Satisfies given Standards wherein Said determining fur ther comprises Statistically analyzing at least one of Said encryption keys.
11. The computer-readable medium of claim 10, the method further comprising:
notifying an entity if at least one of Said encryption keys does not Satisfy Said given Standards. 12. The method of claim 10 wherein said step of statis tically analyzing further comprises:
performing a correlation analysis to determine whether at least one of Said encryption keys correlates with a Specified parameter. 13. A quantum-cryptographic encryption key archive, comprising:
a memory configured to Store instructions, and at least one processor configured to execute the instruc tions to:
receive quantum-cryptographic encryption keys from a plurality of nodes in a network, and Store Said received encryption keys in a database associ ated with Said encryption key archive. 14. A System for archiving quantum-cryptographic encryption keys used for encrypting information in a network, comprising: means for collecting one or more encryption keys gener ated at at least one node in Said network, means for transmitting the one or more collected encryp tion keys to a key archive; and means for Storing Said collected encryption keys in a database of Said key archive. 15. A method of auditing encryption keys used for encrypting information in a network, comprising:
collecting one or more encryption keys generated at a node for encrypting data; providing the one or more collected encryption keys to a key archive; Storing Said collected encryption keys in a database of Said key archive, and determining whether at least one of Said one or more collected keys Satisfies given Standards wherein Said determining further comprises Statistically analyzing at least one of Said one or more collected keys and wherein Said Statistically analyzing further comprises performing a correlation analysis to determine whether at least one of Said one or more collected keys corre lates with a specified parameter. 16. The method of claim 15, further comprising: notifying an entity if Said one or more collected keys does not Satisfy Said given Standards. 17. A computer-readable medium containing instructions for controlling at least one processor to perform a method of auditing encryption keys used for encrypting information in a network, the method comprising:
receiving one or more encryption keys, providing the one or more received encryption keys to a key archive; and determining whether at least one of Said one or more received keys Satisfies given Standards wherein Said determining further comprises Statistically analyzing at least one of Said one or more received keys, and wherein Said Statistically analyzing further comprises performing a correlation analysis to determine whether at least one of Said one or more received keys correlates with a specified parameter. 18. The computer-readable medium of claim 17, the method further comprising:
notifying an entity if Said one or more received keys does not Satisfy Said given Standards. 19. An encryption key archive, comprising: a memory configured to Store instructions and encryption keying bits, and at least one processor configured to execute the instruc tions to: receive one or more encryption keying bits generated at a node for encrypting data, and Statistically analyze at least one of Said one or more keying bits. 20. A data structure encoded on a computer readable medium, comprising: a plurality of encryption key bits received from a plurality 24. A method of transmitting quantum-cryptographic encryption keys used for encrypting information at a node in a network to a key archive, comprising:
collecting one or more encryption keys generated at the node, and transmitting the one or more encryption keys to the key archive.
25. A System for archiving quantum-cryptographic encryption keys used for encrypting information in a network, comprising: a plurality of nodes configured to: collect one or more encryption keys generated at each node, and transmit the one or more collected encryption keys to a key archive for Storage in a database associated with the key archive, and a key archive configured to: receive encryptions keys transmitted from nodes in the network, Store the encryption keys in a database of the key archive.
26. A method of archiving quantum-cryptographic encryption keys used for encrypting information in a network, comprising: receiving quantum cryptographic encryption keys gener ated at a plurality of nodes in a network; and Storing Said received encryption keys in an encryption key archive.
27. A computer-readable medium containing instructions for controlling at least one processor to perform a method of archiving quantum-cryptographic encryption keys used for encrypting information in a network, the method compris ing:
obtaining quantum-cryptographic encryption keys gener ated at a plurality of nodes in a network; and Storing Said received encryption keys in a database of an encryption key archive. 28. A method of auditing quantum-cryptographic encryp tion keys used for encrypting information in a network, comprising:
